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1 Introduction 
The state law of South Africa consists of the common law
1 and the customary 
law.
2 However, in reality there exist various cultural and religious communities 
who lead their private lives outside of state law.
3 For example, the Muslim 
community in South Africa is a close-knit community which lives according to 
their own customs and usages.
4 Muslims are subject to informal religious 
tribunals whose decisions and orders are neither recognised nor reviewable 
by the South African courts.
5  
The non-recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law causes 
unnecessary hardships, especially for women.
6 A Muslim woman is often in a 
"catch two" situation. For example, on the one hand her attempts to divorce 
her husband in terms of Muslim law may be foiled by the relevant religious 
tribunal and, on the other hand, the South African courts may not provide the 
                                                 
*   North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. 
1   The common law of South Africa is a conglomerate of Roman-Dutch law and English law 
as modified by legislation. 
2   Customary law is the law of the traditional communities in South Africa. It deals primarily 
with relationships on a horizontal level, ie relationships between private individuals. The 
status of customary law has been acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha;  Shibi v Sithole;  South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa (to date unrep case no CCT 49/03; CCT 69/03; 
CCT 50/03 delivered on 15 October 2004). 
3   For a discussion on non-state law in South Africa, see the essays contained in Schärf 
and Nina (eds) The Other Law. 
4   See Moosa Shaping Muslim Law for a discussion of the existence of Muslim personal 
law within the sphere of non-state law in South Africa. As far back as 1907 there were 
calls for the recognition of other personal legal systems, such as Muslim personal law. 
See Moosa Analysis 41. 
5   The Muslim community is dominated by the Ulama whose authority is only binding upon 
Muslim adherents.  
6   For a discussion of these hardships, see Rautenbach 2003 QUTLJJ 168-169 and also 
Gabru 2004 PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per/ 1 Dec.  C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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necessary relief, because they might not recognise the validity of her Muslim 
marriage.
7  
Increasingly, South African courts are faced with complex issues regarding 
the Muslim community.
8 The last few years there has been a definite change 
in the courts' attitude with regard to the recognition of certain aspects of 
Muslim personal law. Contrary to pre-1994 court cases, the recent court 
cases attempt to develop the common law to give recognition to certain 
aspects of Muslim personal law.
9 This article attempts to give an overview of 
the recent case law that dealt with issues regarding the recognition of aspects 
of Muslim personal law.  
Another issue, which eventuates from the current situation, is whether the 
South African legal order should continue to have a dualistic legal order or 
whether we should opt for a unified legal order or even a pluralistic legal 
order.
10 In order to address this issue, some comments on the current status 
                                                 
7   In this regard s 5A of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 might be of assistance. It reads: "If it 
appears to a court in divorce proceedings that despite the granting of a decree of divorce 
by the court the spouses or either one of them will, by reason of the prescripts of their 
religion or the religion of either one of them, not be free to remarry unless the marriage is 
also dissolved in accordance with such prescripts or unless a barrier to the remarriage of 
the spouse concerned is removed, the court may refuse to grant a decree of divorce 
unless the court is satisfied that the spouse within whose power it is to have the 
marriage so dissolved or the said barrier so removed, has taken all the necessary steps 
to have the marriage so dissolved or the barrier to the remarriage of the other spouse 
removed or the court may make any other order that it finds just." In Amar v Amar 1999 
3 SA 604 (W) 606 the court held that the purpose of s 5A is to "create mechanisms 
whereby recalcitrant spouses can be encouraged or even pressurised into granting 
religious divorces where these are necessary to enable a spouse to remarry." The court 
found that the acts of the husband in casu were to withhold the get in order to compel his 
wife to amend an agreement between them and held that the most effective way to 
procure the co-operation of the husband to obtain a Jewish divorce would be to order the 
husband to pay maintenance to his wife until their marriage was also dissolved in terms 
of Jewish law. However, the section might be of no assistance to couples whose 
religious marriage is unrecognised in terms of South African law. They would not be able 
to approach a court for a divorce, because in order to obtain a divorce your marriage 
must be valid. See also Bonthuys 2000 SALJ 8-16 and Van Schalkwyk 2000 DJ 186-190 
for a discussion of the facts of the case. See Barker 1998 DR 55-56 for a discussion of 
his reservations on s 5A of the act. 
8   See  Gabru  2004  PER  http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per/ 1 Dec for a discussion of the 
practical problems Muslim women experience on a daily level. 
9   See par 3. 
10   Cachalia Muslim Family Law 31 et seq discusses three "models", which he refers to as 
"legal unity", "legal integration" and "legal pluralism". The first model presumes a single 
unified system that allows cultural and religious differences. For example, a code of C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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of Muslim personal law will be made and, finally, in order to contribute to the 
debate regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law, optional models for 
the recognition of Muslim personal law will briefly be evaluated. 
The author is fully aware of the complexity and sensitivity of the various 
issues with regard to the status of Muslim personal law in South Africa. This 
article does not profess to be a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the 
various issues concerned. It merely comments on some of the issues as 
identified in the court cases and finally attempts to give a brief analysis of 
various models for the future recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law. 
 
2  Muslim personal law in context 
The South African Law Reform Commission has been involved in the 
investigation of Muslim personal law since 1990.
11 The first project committee 
that was appointed did not make much progress with the investigation. The 
reasons for the delay are not very clear. It seems that the finalisation of the 
Constitution
12 and a divergence of opinion on contentious issues are some of 
the reasons that could be advanced. The South African Law Reform 
Commission did not publish any of its findings for discussion. 
In 1996 the South African Law Reform Commission showed renewed interest 
in the investigation. It decided to accord the investigation a high priority rating 
and recommended the appointment of a project committee. During March 
1997 the South African Law Reform Commission held two workshops in order 
                                                                                                                                            
marriage laws could provide for a minimum set of requirements for all marriages in 
South Africa whilst providing for the essential elements of a Muslim marriage. The 
second model doesn't impose one unified law, but makes provision for the integration of 
the legal principles of various legal systems. The Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act may serve as an example of such a model. The third model denotes the formal 
incorporation of different systems of personal law within one legal order. The position in 
India may serve as an example of such a model.  
11   Project 59. 
12   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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to involve members of the public and interested parties. From 78 nominations 
received, the previous minister of Justice appointed a new project committee. 
The new project committee under the leadership of Justice Navsa issued its 
first discussion document at the end of May 2000, namely Issue Paper 15.
13 
According to the South African Law Reform Commission its aim is to: 
… investigate the legal recognition of Islamic Marriages and other 
aspects of Islamic Personal Law. 
At the end of 2001 the South African Law Reform Commission published 
Discussion Paper 101.
14 The closing date for comment was 31 January 2002. 
The discussion document contained a proposed Draft Bill on Islamic 
Marriages.
15 The Draft Bill makes provision for, inter alia, the recognition of 
Muslim marriages in South Africa,
16 the requirements for a valid Muslim 
marriage,
17 the registration,
18 proprietary consequences
19 and dissolution
20 of 
Muslim marriages and the status and capacity of spouses in Muslim 
marriages.
21 All responses received up to and including 10 April 2000 were 
published by the South African Law Reform Commission in a special 
document referred to as "Collation of Submissions on Discussion Paper 101: 
Islamic and Related Matters".
22 The responses were considered by the South 
African Law Reform Commission and the result was an amended version of 
                                                 
13   SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Project 59). The closing date for comment 
on the issue paper was the end of July 2000. Although it is not normal for the SALC to 
respond to submissions prior to the release of a discussion paper, it released a 
document containing some of the responses and the names of the respondents to Issue 
Paper 15. SALC Responses http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/issue.html 1 Nov. 
14   SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Discussion Paper 101) 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/discussn/discussn.html 1 Nov. 
15   SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Discussion Paper 101) 49. 
16   Cl 4. 
17   Cl 5. 
18   Cl 6. 
19   Cl 8. 
20   Cl 14. 
21   Cl 3. 
22   SALC Collation of Submissions 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/discussn/collationdp101.doc 1 Nov. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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the Draft Bill
23 which was included in a report
24 submitted to the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development in July 2003.
25  
The Draft Bill, although it underwent considerable changes, is applicable to a 
Muslim marriage only if the parties elected it to be applicable to their 
marriage.
26 The Draft Bill also addresses the situation where parties were 
married before the commencement of the act
27 and where the parties were 
involved in civil or customary marriages.
28 The Draft Bill affords equal status 
to Muslim spouses
29 and prescribes the proprietary consequences of a 
Muslim marriage.
30 The Draft Bill further addresses the registration of Muslim 
marriages,
31 the dissolution of Muslim marriages,
32 custody of and access to 
minor children
33 and maintenance.
34 
The general viewpoint is that the Draft Bill will alleviate the hardships that 
existed as a result of non-recognition of Muslim marriages. Although concerns 
exist regarding the non-support of the Draft Bill amongst some groupings of 
the Muslim community, it is generally accepted that it will eventually create 
certainty regarding the validity of Muslim marriages, and that it will give effect 
                                                 
23   Currently referred to as the Draft Bill on Muslim Marriages (the name changed from 
Islamic marriages to Muslim marriages).  
24   SALC Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 110-133.  
25   The submission of the report to the minister was in terms of s 7(1) of the South African 
Law Reform Commission Act 19 of 1973. 
26   Cl 2(1). Cl 5 lists the requirements for a valid Muslim marriage. 
27    Cl 2(2) – the act will be applicable to previous Muslim marriages unless the parties 
elected not to be bound by the provisions of the act. 
28   Cl 2(4)(a) lays down that the act only applies to an existing civil marriage, if the parties 
elected it to be applicable; cl 2(4)(b) lay down that it does not apply to a civil marriage 
concluded after commencement of the act and cl 2(4)(c) lays down that it does not apply 
to a customary marriage registered in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act 120 of 1998. 
29   Cl 3. The act does not purport to regulate the legal status of Muslim men and women in 
general. 
30   Contrary to a civil marriage, which is in community of property unless an antenuptial 
contract stipulated otherwise, a Muslim marriage is out of community of property – see cl 
8. 
31   In terms of cl 8 Muslim marriages concluded before and after the commencement of the 
act must be registered. However, failure to register such marriage does not affect the 
validity of the marriage. 
32   In terms of cl 9 the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 applies to the dissolution of the marriage and 
includes dissolution on any ground permitted by Muslim law. 
33   Cl 11. 
34   Cl 12. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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to Muslim values.
35 To date no legislation with regard to Muslim personal law 
have been enacted. 
Until the legislation, as proposed in the Draft Bill, has been enacted the South 
African courts will be the forum to approach, if aggrieved Muslim parties want 
alleviation of the hardships caused by non-recognition of the validity of their 
marriages. So far the courts are continually approached by aggrieved Muslim 
parties who cannot wait for legislative reform in order to improve their current 
situation. In view of the fact that Muslim personal law (to date) receives no 
legislative recognition, these cases had to resort to the common law in order 
to seek ways to protect the interests of the aggrieved parties who approached 
them. In the following paragraph some of these decisions will be discussed. 
 
3  Viewpoints of the courts 
In terms of sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution the courts have the 
power to develop the common law. Such development "must promote the 
spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights." Up to 1997 the courts have 
refused to develop the common law in order to afford legal protection to 
parties involved in a Muslim marriage because Muslim marriages are 
potentially polygamous and, therefore, contra bonos mores and invalid.
36 
Today, however, various sections in the  Constitution  guarantee rights and 
freedoms based on culture and religion.
37 These "new" values embedded in 
the Constitution are reflected in the recent judgments of our courts that used 
their newly acquired development function to develop the South African 
common law in order to recognise some aspects of Muslim personal law.  
                                                 
35   SouthAfrica.info http://www.southafrica.info/women/islamicmarriages.htm 1 Nov. 
36   Rautenbach 2003 QUTLJJ 169. 
37   For a discussion of these rights and freedoms, see Rautenbach, Jansen van Rensburg 
and Pienaar 2003 PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per 1 Nov. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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The first case that deviated from a long line of decisions which were all 
against the recognition of Muslim marriages was Ryland v Edros.
38 The court 
was prepared to develop the common law to give recognition to the 
contractual consequences of a Muslim marriage.
39 Mr Ryland (the plaintiff) 
and Ms Edros (the defendant) entered into a de facto monogamous Muslim 
marriage that did not comply with the provisions of the Marriage Act
40 and 
which was, therefore, invalid in terms of South African law. Plaintiff divorced 
defendant by serving the talaq
41 on her. Then he instituted an action in court 
to evict her from the house that they shared as husband and wife. Defendant 
defended the action and instituted a counter-claim for arrear maintenance,
42 a 
consolatory gift
43 and an equitable portion of the growth of applicant's 
estate.
44 She based her claim on the "contractual agreement" constituted by 
their Muslim marriage.  
Farlam j pointed out that two preliminary questions
45 had to be answered, 
namely whether it was appropriate for the court to pronounce upon religious 
matters
46 and, secondly, whether the Ismail case
47 prevented the parties from 
relying on the marriage contract that formed the basis of their Muslim 
marriage.  
                                                 
38   Ryland v Edros 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C). The case was decided when the 1993 Constitution 
was still in force. However, s 14 of the 1993  Constitution  is similar to s 15 of the 
Constitution, and the decision is still relevant to the interpretation of the Constitution. See 
also Rautenbach 2003 Koers 136-140. 
39   See 696C-697G for the facts of the case. 
40   Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
41   Talaq refers to the dissolution of a valid marriage contract by means of using the word 
talaq or a synonym thereof. A talaq pronounced by a husband may be two-fold: 
revocable and irrevocable. See Moosa Divorce 67. Definitions for irrevocable talaq and 
revocable talaq are also contained in cl 1 of the Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim 
Marriages defines talaq as "the dissolution of a Muslim marriage, forwith or at a later 
stage, by a husband, or his wife or agent, duly authorised by him or her to do so, using 
the word Talaq or a synonym or derivative thereof in any language, and includes the 
pronouncement of a Talaq pursuant to a Tafwid al-Talaq." The Draft Bill also 
distinguishes between the definitions of an irrevocable and a revocable talaq. 
42  For the period of their marriage. 
43   Applicant alleged that the divorce was without just cause, at 696G. 
44   Applicant alleged that she contributed labour, effort and money to her husband's estate 
and that she is, therefore, entitled to an equitable portion thereof, at 696H. 
45   701G-702A. 
46   Farlam j refers to it as the "doctrine of entanglement". 
47   Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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With regard to the first question Farlam j pointed out that the courts, in the 
past, did not involve themselves in religious matters "unless some proprietary 
or other legally recognised right was involved".
48 He argued that section 14 of 
the 1993 Constitution
49 might have changed the position and that the doctrine 
of entanglement might now be part of South African law. However, since the 
representatives of the parties agreed that the present issues did not require 
the interpretation of religious issues, there was no question of doctrinal 
entanglement and it was, therefore, not necessary for the court to deal with 
the question.
50 
With regard to the second question Farlam j held that public policy was a 
question of fact.
51 Because public policy is based on facts, it can only change 
if there is a change in the facts on which it is based. Since the 1993 
Constitution introduced considerable changes in the factual position of public 
policy in South African law, it was possible to revise the Ismail case. If the 
"spirit, purport and objects" of the 1993  Constitution  and the basic values 
underlying it were in conflict with the view regarding public policy, as 
expressed in the Ismail case, then the values underlying the 1993 Constitution 
had to prevail.
52 After assessing the underlying values of the 1993 
Constitution the views regarding public policy as expressed in the Ismail case, 
the court came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the contract 
arising from a Muslim marriage was "contrary to the accepted customs and 
usages which are regarded as morally binding upon all members of our 
                                                 
48   703E. Quoted from Allen v Gibbs 1977 3 SA 212 (SE) 218A-B. 
49   The wording of s 13 of the 1993 Constitution is similar to the wording of s 15 of the 1996 
Constitution.  
50  703B-J. It may, however, be argued that the court did indeed interpret religious issues by 
choosing the evidence of one expert witness over the other on the issue of division of 
property between the parties (715-714). 
51   704B. He referred to the 1993 Constitution, which was the beginning of the new South 
African constitutional dispensation. According to Mahomed 1997 DR 189 it is clear that 
the concept of public policy is not a vague and arbitrary concept ie "… open to abuse by 
an executive-minded judiciary. Rather it operates within definite parameters and is 
guided by the interpretation provision …" of the 1993 Constitution. 
52   705. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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society" or that it was "fundamentally opposed to our principles and 
institutions" as expressed in the Ismail case
53 and said: 
[I]t is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one 
group to impose its values on another and that the Courts should only 
brand a contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those 
values which are shared by the community at large, by all right-
thinking people in the community and not only by one section of it.
54 
Secondly, Farlam j referred to the principles of equality, diversity and 
multiculturalism, which conform to the values of the 1993 Constitution. In his 
opinion these values "irradiate" the concept of public policy that the courts 
have to apply.
55 He differed from the viewpoint expressed in the Ismail case, 
namely that the contracts in issue were contra bonos mores and held:  
In my opinion the 'radiating' effect of the values underlying the new 
Constitution
56 is such that neither of these grounds for holding the 
contractual terms under consideration in this case to be unlawful can 
be supported.
57 
Finally he came to the conclusion that the marriage contract between the 
parties was not contra bonos mores. As a result the Ismail case no longer 
"operates to preclude a court from enforcing claims such as those brought by" 
parties to an Islamic union. The court then proceeded to consider the counter-
claim of the defendant and awarded her arrear maintenance after considering 
the facts.
58 The question of whether the defendant was entitled to a 
                                                 
53   707E (own emphasis). 
54   707G. 
55   707H-709A. 
56   The 1993 Constitution. 
57   709C. 
58    711D-714F. The defendant claimed arrear maintenance from January 1977 (date of 
marriage) to 14 January 1993 (third month after third talaq was served). The court 
pointed out that the parties concluded a contract in terms of which they agreed that their 
marriage would be governed by Islamic law. It was common cause that the rules of the 
Shafi'i school are relevant in this case. Under the Shafi'i school the plaintiff is obliged to 
maintain his wife during their marriage and for a period of three months after talaq. It is 
therefore clear that plaintiff and defendant agreed (in terms of their marriage contract) 
that plaintiff would maintain defendant during their marriage and for three months after 
talaq, and that any unpaid maintenance would accumulate as a debt, and that 
prescription of such a debt would not be possible. The court held, however, that 
prescription is for the benefit of the general public and that an agreement to renounce 
prescription (as in this case) would be against public policy. Therefore, plaintiff is only C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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consolatory gift stood over for later determination.
59 Regarding the claim for 
an equitable share in the plaintiff's estate, the court found that the defendant 
could not prove that such a custom existed among the Muslim population and 
that her claim had to fail.
60 
This case is seen as one of the landmark decisions regarding the rights of 
Muslims in South Africa. Although it did not recognise the validity of a Muslim 
marriage, it did give recognition to the contractual consequences of the 
marriage contract between a Muslim husband and wife. Such recognition 
affords a Muslim wife protection when or if the marriage is dissolved. The 
position where there is more than one wife, that is, in a polygamous union, is 
still undecided.  
A different conclusion was reached in the Durban High Court in Amod v 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund.
61 Mr and Ms Amod (the applicant) 
entered into a Muslim marriage, which did not comply with the requirements of 
the Marriage Act
62 and was, therefore, not regarded as a valid marriage. Mr 
Amod was killed in a motor accident and the applicant lodged a claim for 
compensation for loss of support by reason of Mr Amod's death against the 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (the respondent). The respondent 
denied liability on the ground of the fact that the marriage between Mr Amod 
and the applicant was a void Muslim marriage. The applicant contended, 
                                                                                                                                            
liable to pay maintenance to defendant for the period from 25 October 1991 (ie three 
years before defendant's counter-claim was served on plaintiff's attorneys) to 14 January 
1993 (ie three months after the marriage was terminated by the third talaq.)  
59    714G-H. Plaintiff and defendant had to lead evidence regarding plaintiff's conduct 
regarding the divorce before the issue could be decided. 
60    Defendant's counsel argued that defendant was entitled to an equitable portion of 
plaintiff's estate. He based his argument on legislation enacted in Malaysia, namely s 58 
of the Malaysian Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 that confers upon a 
court the power to order a division of assets between divorcing parties (715D-717A). The 
court did not accept his argument and held: "It is clear, in my view, that the Malaysian 
rules are based, in part at least, on Malay custom which, not being in conflict with the 
essential principles of Islamic law, is capable of being synthesised therewith. In view of 
the fact that no other Islamic country … adopts this approach, I cannot see on what 
basis I can regard the Malaysian rules as being part of the provisions of Islamic personal 
law incorporated by the parties into their contract unless a custom similar to the Malay 
adat relating to harta sepencarian prevails among the Islamic community, to which the 
parties belong, in the Western Cape." (717B-D). 
61   Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D). C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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however, that Mr Amod had a contractual obligation (based on the marriage 
contract) to support her.
63  
The question before the court was whether the respondent was legally liable 
to compensate the respondent for her loss of support. In terms of South 
African common law, such a liability would exist if Mr Amod were, during his 
life, under a common law duty to support the applicant.
64 However, due to the 
Ismail case, which held that a Muslim marriage was contra bonos mores, such 
a duty did not exist if the parties had been married in terms of Islamic law.
65 
The applicant's counsel argued, first of all, that there had been a change in 
public policy regarding the conclusion of Muslim marriages that had changed 
the traditional position. Meskin j found, however, that the onus to prove such a 
change rested on the applicant and that she could not prove that there had 
been a change of policy since the Ismail case.
66  
Secondly, applicant's counsel argued that the court should develop the 
common law to recognise a duty to support arising out of a Muslim marriage.
67 
Meskin j held that, although the facts of the case occurred before the 
commencement of the Constitution, it was in the interest of justice to apply the 
Constitution to the facts of the case.
68 Upon interpretation of sections 39(2),
69 
8(2)
70 and 8(3)
71 of the Constitution he came to the conclusion that section 
                                                                                                                                            
62   Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
63   In terms of the Muslim marriage, which is a contract, the husband is obliged to support 
and maintain his wife. 
64   In terms of s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 a partner in a customary 
marriage may also claim for loss of support as a result of the death of the breadwinner. 
65   1719I. 
66   1720C. 
67   S 39(2) read with s 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
68 1722E. 
69   "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights." 
70   "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent 
that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right." 
71   "When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2), a court - (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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39(2) does not give a general power to the courts to develop the common law 
"to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights." The court 
argues that, if section 39(2) is read with sections 8(2) and (3), it is clear that 
the development of the common law the legislature had in mind is 
development  
… in order to give effect to a right in the Bill … to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right' … It is not intended that 
the Court is to have a general power of development of the common 
law to 'promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights' 
independently of giving effect, when applying a provision of the Bill of 
Rights to a natural or juristic person, to 'a right in the Bill … to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.
72  
The applicant's counsel argued that that the right to equality
73 that includes 
the right not to be unfairly discriminated against on the grounds of marital 
status or religion and the right to dignity are relevant to the facts of the case.
74 
Taking the facts of the case into consideration, Meskin j agreed that "a refusal 
to recognise the contractual duty of support upon which [the applicant] relies 
as being sufficient to ground the liability which she seeks to enforce 
constitutes, indeed, a violation" of these rights. He agrees that such refusal 
results in the unequal treatment of persons before the law, that is, between 
females lawfully married in terms of the civil law to a deceased breadwinner 
and those married illegally to a deceased breadwinner in terms of non-
recognised Muslim law. Although such refusal results in the unequal treatment 
before the law, the question is whether the court has the power to develop the 
common law by elimination of a principle that already forms part of it.
75 The 
court read its power to develop the common law as restrictive, that is not to 
eliminate principles that already form a part of it. With reference to Du Plessis 
                                                                                                                                            
that right; and (b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that 
the limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1)." 
72   S 8(3)(a). 1722H-J. In Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 4 BCLR 444 
(T) Roux j held that the time has arrived for recognition of a reciprocal duty of support 
owed by parties to a same-sex union. Such recognition is in accordance with the court's 
duty to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing the 
common law (448H-J). 
73   S 9 of the Constitution. 
74   S 10 of the Constitution. 
75   1723C-D. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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v De Klerk
76 Meskin j held that it is the intention of section 8(3)(a) that any 
alteration or elimination of the common law should remain the function of the 
legislature.
77 The court came to the conclusion that it may not alter the 
existing law regarding a claim for loss of support to include a duty to support 
in terms of a contractual relationship resulting from a Muslim marriage, and 
the applicant's claim was denied.
78  
After the decision in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund
79 had 
been delivered, the applicant applied for leave to appeal directly to the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court found that the crucial question 
in the application before the court was whether the common law should be 
developed to allow the applicant to claim damages for support. Since it was 
the viewpoint of the Constitutional Court that this question is one which falls 
primarily within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the 
application for leave to appeal was dismissed. Although it could not be said 
that the Constitutional Court was misdirected in its findings, the reluctance (or 
caution) of the courts to apply the Bill of Rights directly to private relationships 
is illustrated.  
Ms Amod (the appellant) appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal in Amod v 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality 
Intervening).
80 On behalf of the appellant and the Commission for Gender 
Equality it was argued that the common law rules make provision for a claim 
for loss of support of a Muslim widow. In the alternative, it was argued that, if 
                                                 
76   Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 691D-E: "The Lawgiver did not say that 
Courts should invalidate rules of common law inconsistent … or declare them 
unconstitutional." 
77   1723H-I. See Rautenbach 2003 Koers 136-140 for her criticism of the court's restrictive 
interpretation of its developmental function. 
78   The court distinguished the issues of this case from the issues present in Ryland v Edros 
1997 2 SA 690 (C) and correctly held on 1726E that the court in Ryland v Edros did not 
hold that a Muslim marriage is a lawful marriage or that it generated a legal duty to 
support a wife. 
79   Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1998 4 SA 753 (CC). 
80   Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality 
Intervening) 1999 4 SA 119 (SCA). For a discussion of the issues raised in the case see, 
Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 302-314. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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the rules of the common law do not make such provision, the common law 
should be developed in terms of section 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution.
81  
The Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (the respondent) alleged that an 
Islamic marriage does not enjoy the same status as a civil marriage, that the 
duty to support was a "contractual consequence of the union between them 
and not an ex lege consequence of the marriage per se", and that the action 
for loss of support should not be extended to include claims for loss of support 
pursuant to a contractual duty to furnish support. The action for loss of 
support, it was argued, should be restricted to cases in which the duty of 
support is one of the common law consequences of a valid marriage.
82 
The court found that the appellant had a good cause of action, based on the 
fact that the deceased had a legally enforceable duty to support the appellant; 
the duty arose from a solemn marriage in accordance with the tenets of a 
recognised and accepted faith; and that it was a duty which deserved 
protection and recognition for the purposes of the dependant's action.
83 The 
question was not whether the marriage was lawful at common law, but 
whether the deceased had a duty to support the appellant during the 
subsistence of the marriage.
84 The court based its findings on an "important 
shift in the identifiable boni mores of the community" that "must also manifest 
itself in a corresponding evolution in the relevant parameters of application in 
this area,"
85 and on the test laid down in Santam v Henery.
86 The court stated 
that the non-recognition of an action for loss of support in the case of a 
monogamous Islamic marriage is "inconsistent with the new ethos of 
tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom"
87 and held that the respondent 
                                                 
81   See par [5]. The 1993 Constitution was in effect when the action commenced in the 
court a quo. 
82   Par [16].  
83   Par [26] and [30]. 
84   Par [19]. 
85   Par [23]. 
86   Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) 427 H-J, 429 C-D, 430D-I. 
87   Par [20]. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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was liable for damages for the loss of support suffered by the appellant in 
consequence of the death of her husband.
88 
It is important to realise that the court did not give recognition to Muslim 
marriages. It only extended the claim of a surviving spouse (married in terms 
of the common law) for loss of support to surviving spouses married in terms 
of unrecognised Muslim personal law. The court also did not deal with 
polygamous Muslim marriages, and it is uncertain whether spouses involved 
in such marriages would receive similar protection. 
In 2003 the High Court in Daniels v Campbell,
89 was invited to test, inter alia, 
the constitutionality of certain sections of the Intestate Succession Act
90 and 
the  Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
91 in order to grant relief to a 
Muslim wife whose husband died intestate. Mrs Daniels (the applicant) 
concluded a second marriage with Mr Daniels in terms of Islamic law. The 
marriage was not registered in terms of the Marriage Act, but the city of Cape 
Town was informed of the marriage and in accordance with the then 
applicable policy the tenancy of the house, which was allocated to her after 
her divorce with her first husband, was transferred to Mr Daniels. Tenants of 
houses were later given the opportunity to purchase such houses and as a 
result Mr Daniels bought the house. The deed of sale incorrectly reflected that 
the couple was married in community of property.
92  
Mr Daniels died intestate and the house, which was his main asset, was 
transferred to his estate. Mr Daniels and the applicant had no children, but Mr 
Daniels had four children from a previous relationship. They are the fifth, sixth 
and seventh respondents and the late MC Daniels. In turn MC Daniels (who 
was predeceased) had four children, all of whom were minors when the 
                                                 
88   The court did not find it necessary to discuss the application of s 35(3) of the 1993 
Constitution or s 39(2) of the Constitution, as it was able to reach its conclusion without 
reliance on those provisions – see par [30]. 
89   Daniels v Campbell 2003 9 BCLR 969 (C) – hereafter referred to as the Daniels case. 
90   Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
91   Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
92   The normal consequence of a Muslim marriage is a marriage out of community.  C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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proceedings were instituted. The four children's mothers and natural 
guardians are the third and fourth respondents. After the death of Mr Daniels, 
the late MC Daniels and the third, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents 
threatened to throw the applicant out of the house. 
The applicant approached the High Court for the first time in 1998 for an order 
declaring that she was entitled to the said house.
93 The application was 
dismissed on various grounds that included, inter alia, the non-compliance of 
some of the procedural requirements by the applicant and the non-recognition 
of the validity of the Muslim marriage of Mr Daniels and the applicant. The 
court was also of the opinion that new legislation had to be promulgated in 
order to recognise the validity of Muslim marriages in South Africa. 
The applicant then approached the High Court for a second time for an order 
declaring that she was a spouse
94 for the purposes of the Intestate 
Succession Act and that she is, therefore, an heir in his deceased estate.
95 
Secondly, she applied for an order declaring that she was a survivor
96 of the 
deceased and that she accordingly had a claim for maintenance in terms of 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. To cater for the possibility that the 
court would refuse these orders, the applicant sought for alternative orders 
which provide, firstly, for a declaration of unconstitutionality of certain 
omissions (that is surviving Muslim spouses) in the Intestate Succession Act 
                                                 
93   See Daniels v Campbell 2003 9 BCLR 969 (C). 
94   S 1(a)-(c) of the Intestate Succession Act reads as follows: "(1) If after the 
commencement of this Act a person (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') dies 
intestate, either wholly or in part, and - (a) is survived by a spouse, but not by a 
descendant, such spouse shall inherit the intestate estate; (b) is survived by a 
descendant, but not by a spouse, such descendant shall inherit the intestate estate; (c) 
is survived by a spouse as well as a descendant - (i) such spouse shall inherit a child's 
share of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in 
value the amount fixed from time to time by the Minister of Justice by notice in the 
Gazette, whichever is the greater; and (ii) such descendant shall inherit the residue (if 
any) of the intestate estate." Own emphasis. 
95   See Daniels v Campbell 2003 9 BCLR 969 (C). 
96   S 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act states: "If a marriage is dissolved by 
death after the commencement of this act the survivor shall have a claim against the 
estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable maintenance needs 
until his death or remarriage in so far as he is not able to provide therefor from his own 
means and earnings." Own emphasis. In terms of s 1 of the act "survivor" is defined as 
"the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death."  C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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and the Maintenance of the Surviving Spouses Act and, secondly, for the 
"reading in" of certain provisions into the Intestate Succession Act and the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act in order to rectify these omissions.  
Three issues arose for determination. The first issue was whether the 
applicant can be prevented to raise the issue of constitutionality with regard to 
her right to inherit in terms of the Intestate Succession Act on the grounds of 
the rule of res judicata, or alternatively, of the doctrine of estoppel? Although a 
previous application had been dismissed with costs, the court held that it 
could not be said that the interpretative and/or the constitutional issue in 
respect of the Intestate Succession Act was fully canvassed by both parties in 
the 1998 application, nor that the court made a final pronouncement in that 
application. As a result, the court held that first and second respondents 
reliance on res judicata and estoppel had to fail. 
The second issue was whether the word "spouse", as contained in the 
Intestate Succession Act and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, can 
be interpreted to include a husband or wife married in terms of Muslim rites? 
The court reluctantly concluded that the word "spouse" could not be 
interpreted so as to include a person in the dire position of the applicant and 
held that the word "spouse" had to be given its "traditional, limited meaning". 
Van Heerden j was of the view that the word "spouse" only applied to spouses 
whose marriage was valid in terms of South African law and, accordingly, the 
two acts could not be interpreted to include the parties to a Muslim marriage. 
As a result the applicant was not a "spouse" (or "survivor") for the purposes of 
the acts.
97 
The third issue was whether the failure to define a husband or wife (who 
concluded a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage in accordance with 
Muslim rites) as a "spouse" the purpose of the Intestate Succession Act and 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act renders the relevant provisions of 
the acts unconstitutional and invalid and, if so, whether such invalidity can be C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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rectified by the "reading in" of the provisions proposed by Mrs Daniels. The 
court agreed with the applicant's argument that the exclusion of Muslim 
spouses from the definition of "spouse" boils down to unfair discrimination on 
the grounds of equality, religion and culture which cannot be tolerated in the 
new constitutional order. The court could find no justification for the limitation 
of these rights and held that effective relief could be afforded by a suitable 
reading-in order that includes a surviving spouse to a monogamous Muslim 
marriage in the definition of spouse in the relevant acts.
98 
The order of the court was referred to the Constitutional Court
99 for 
confirmation in terms of sections 172(2)(a)
100 and 167(5)
101 of the 
Constitution.
102 In the Constitutional Court it was again argued on behalf of 
the applicant that a proper interpretation of the word "spouse" would include 
Muslim spouses in the position of the applicant. The Minister supported the 
confirmation of the High Court order, but was not prepared to concede that 
the word "spouse" includes a Muslim spouse. The executors, on the other 
hand, contended that the word "spouse" did not include Muslim spouses and 
further, that the relevant provisions of the Intestate Succession Act and the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act are not unconstitutional. They based 
there contention on two facts, namely that an Imam is not barred from being 
registered as a marriage officer under the Marriage Act and is, therefore, not 
disqualified from being registered as a marriage officer and, secondly, that a 
                                                                                                                                            
97   See the comments of Goolam and Rautenbach 2004 Stell LR 372-376. 
98   Par [82]. 
99   Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) at par [40]. 
100  S 172(2)(a) states: "The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar 
status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, 
a provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity 
has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court." Own emphasis. 
101  This section reads: "The Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of 
Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must 
confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a 
court of similar status, before that order has any force." 
102  The applicant was concerned that the Constitutional Court might refuse to confirm the 
declaration of invalidity and accordingly she applied for leave to appeal against the 
interpretation given to the word "spouse", should the application for confirmation fail. The 
High Court was of the opinion that a contextual and purposive reading of the act could 
well lead to a different order by the Constitutional Court and granted conditional leave to 
appeal as requested by the applicant. See par [14]. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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Muslim couple has a choice to conclude a marriage that is valid in terms of 
South African law.  
Without much ado, Sachs j commenced his majority judgment with the 
observation that the word "spouse" in its ordinary meaning includes parties to 
a Muslim marriage. According to him the exclusion of parties to a Muslim 
marriage in the past emanated from a linguistically strained used of the word 
spouse that flowed from a "culturally and racially hegemonic appropriation of 
it".
103 He points out that a restricted interpretation of the word "spouse" is: 
… discriminatory, expressly exalting a particular concept of marriage, 
flowing initially from a particular world-view, as the ideal against which 
Muslim marriages were measured and found to be wanting.
104 
According to Sachs j the constitutional values of equality, tolerance and 
respect for diversity point strongly in favour of a broad and inclusive 
interpretation of the word "spouse".
105 According to Sachs j the question is not 
whether the applicant was lawfully married to the deceased, but whether the 
applicant is entitled to be protected in terms of the relevant Acts. Contextual 
interpretations of the Acts finally lead the court to conclude that the parties to 
a Muslim marriage are also spouses in terms of the Intestate Succession Act 
or survivors in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. The court 
clearly distinguishes this viewpoint with the conclusion reached in the cases 
dealing with same-sex life partners where it were found that a "spouse" did 
not include such a partner.
106  
Sachs j emphasises that the "inclusive" meaning he affords to the word 
"spouse" does not mean that there is a general recognition of the 
consequences of a Muslim marriage for other purposes. In other words, the 
broad interpretation given to the word "spouse" in terms of the relevant acts 
has no implications for the wider question of legislative recognition of aspects 
                                                 
103  Par [19]. 
104  Par [20]. 
105  Par [21]. He equates his argument with the situation in Britain where it was formerly held 
that the word "person" in certain legislation did not include women - see par [22] n 29. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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of Muslim personal law.
107 He also did not deal with the complex issues 
regarding polygamous Muslim marriages.
108 
The order of the High Court was set aside and replaced with a new order 
declaring the word "spouse" in the Intestate Succession Act and the word 
"survivor" to be broad enough to include a surviving partner to a monogamous 
Muslim marriage.
109 
To date the cases that dealt with aspects of Muslim law did it on an ad hoc 
basis. In most recent cases the courts have developed the common law in 
order to provide for protection for, especially, Muslim women who turn to them 
for protection. Legal certainty and adequate protection of the rights of Muslim 
women could only be achieved by legislative recognition of Muslim personal 
law. Although it seems as if the South African Law Reform Commission has 
decided to opt for piecemeal legislation that recognises certain aspects of 
Muslim law, which is Muslim marriages, there are various possibilities of how 
it could be done. These possibilities will be explored in the following 
paragraphs. 
4  Legislative recognition of Muslim personal law 
A general act, which may be referred to as the Muslim Family Law Application 
Act, could be enacted to give recognition to uncodified Muslim personal law. 
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act
110 in operation in India 
could be used as an example. Section 2 of the Act applies Muslim personal 
law to all matters regarding 
… intestate succession, special property of females, including 
personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any 
other provision of personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, 
including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubara'at, maintenance, 
                                                                                                                                            
106  See par [28]. 
107 Par  [26]. 
108  Par [36]. 
109  Par [40]. 
110  Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 26 of 1937. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs (other 
than charities and charitable institutions and religious endowments). 
The act could also make provision for the institution, status and role of the 
Ulama, which could function in a similar way as traditional authorities in terms 
of customary law. The act does not have to contain substantive provisions of 
Muslim personal law and it could be left to either the courts or legislature to 
develop the substantive provisions of Muslim personal law.
111 
If Muslim personal law is recognised by means of a general act the 
Constitution will be directly applicable thereto through the intervention of the 
legislature.
112 One of the advantages of such recognition is that Muslim 
personal law would be subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights, which would 
ensure the striking down of unconstitutional rules of Muslim personal law. But 
approaching the courts has been a costly and time-consuming affair. There is 
also no guarantee that women who are discriminated against would have the 
means and strength to approach the courts for protection of their rights. If 
Muslim personal law is recognised in South Africa the question regarding 
jurisdiction of courts could become an important one. Would the existing 
courts have the jurisdiction to decide on matters of religion or would the 
jurisdiction of the Ulama be extended to receive binding jurisdiction similar to 
that of the courts of South Africa? It would also be a possibility to deal with the 
matter first through the Ulama, and if the parties are not satisfied with the 
outcome they may go to the South African courts (more or less the same as 
the current system of customary courts).
113 
Another problem emanating from the previous one has to do with the 
developmental function of the courts. In terms of sections 8(2), 39(2) and 173 
the courts have the power to develop the common law and customary law to 
                                                 
111  Something similar to the common law that could either be developed by the courts or by 
means of legislation. 
112  S 8(1) of the Constitution. The horizontal and vertical debate regarding the application of 
the Bill of Rights is irrelevant where legislative enactments are concerned. The common 
law is of general application, whilst the application of Muslim personal law will be 
regulated by means of legislation.  
113  The same question may be asked regarding the Beth Din of the Jews. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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promote the "spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights." These sections 
make no mention of other legal systems that may be recognised in terms of 
section 15(3) of the Constitution. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the courts 
would have the power to develop Muslim personal law in order to promote the 
"spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights". The courts would, however, 
be entitled to strike down a rule of Muslim personal law that is 
unconstitutional. Declaring a rule of Muslim personal law unconstitutional 
without the power to develop such a rule would leave a vacuum in Muslim 
personal law, which could only be rectified by means of legislation or by 
developing the common law.
114 
A third problem, which could emanate from a general act recognising Muslim 
personal law, has to do with legal uncertainty. Currently in South Africa there 
is a lack of reliable sources regarding Muslim personal law. Very few 
universities teach the principles of religious legal systems and few scholars or 
court officials have any knowledge of these legal systems. It would, therefore, 
be risky to leave it in the hands of the judiciary and legal practitioners to 
determine the content of Muslim personal law in order to apply it in practice. 
 
5  Legislative recognition of codified Muslim personal law
115 
Some of the problems caused by the previous proposal could be resolved by 
the codification of Muslim personal law.
116 Codification would ensure the 
evaluation of Muslim personal law in order to conform it to constitutional 
demands of human dignity, equality and freedom. This task would be difficult 
if not impossible to achieve for a variety of reasons. In the first place Muslims 
argue that Muslim personal law has a divine character which renders it 
                                                 
114  See Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 313. 
115  This is proposed by Moosa 1995 Stell LR 424. 
116  The recognition of Muslim personal law could be delayed until codification has been 
finalised or a phased approach could be followed. The latter approach entails the 
recognition of partly codified Muslim personal law after the finalisation of each phase. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
23/34 
immutable.
117 Secondly, various schools of Islamic thought exist. Which 
school or schools must be recognised in South Africa?
118 Furthermore, the 
classic Muslim personal law has been modified in various dominant Muslim 
countries.
119 Which of the many schools of which of the many versions of 
Muslim personal law (classic or reformed Muslim personal law) must be 
recognised in South Africa? Also, which branches of Muslim personal law 
should be recognised (for example the law of marriage, divorce and 
succession)?  
Although the codification of Muslim personal law would obviate some of the 
criticisms raised in the previous proposal, the recognition of codified Muslim 
personal law would give rise to a plurality of legal systems, which has its own 
unique problems.
120 However plausible, South Africa should be cautious of a 
plurality of legal systems. Experience in other countries has shown that such 
a model leads to conflict and legal uncertainty. India, which has a Muslim 
minority of approximately 11½%, has a secular system of law that gives 
recognition to a variety of legal systems. As already stated, the seemingly 
blissful co-existence of the various legal systems leads to conflict and 
uncertainty and, in some instances, to the detriment of women living in India. 
Courts are often so caught up in issues dealing with conflict of laws that the 
real issues disappear in a mist of confusion and perplexity.  
Other issues that must also be dealt with have to do with the conflict of laws. If 
Muslim personal law is recognised, persons should have the choice to opt for 
Muslim personal law or the law of South Africa. Problems regarding choice of 
                                                 
117  Faridi Islamic Personal Law 123-127. Some writers take a more liberal view. According 
to them, Muslim law consists of secular and religious elements. The religious element 
includes the five basic concepts of Islam, which are immutable and may not be changed. 
These concepts include Kalima (the unity of God and the prophetic character of God), 
Namaz (prayer five times a day), Ramajdan (feasting during certain days), Zakkadh 
(charity to the poor) and Jajj (pilgrimage to the holy city of Mekka). The secular element 
includes, inter alia, the law of crimes, the law of evidence, the law of marriage, the law of 
contract and the law of succession. These matters are susceptible to change and may 
be altered. Rathnapaki Uniform Civil Code 11-16. 
118  The conflicts arising from the various denominations in Islam are clearly illustrated in 
Mohamed v Jassiem 1996 1 SA 673 (A). 
119  Mahmood Statutes of Personal Law 3 et seq. 
120  Sinclair Law of Marriage 211-213. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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law include questions such as: Who would have the option to choose Muslim 
personal law? At what stage (or age) can one choose Muslim personal law? 
What law would be applicable when one party to a marriage chooses Muslim 
personal law and the other South African law? Which law will be applicable to 
the children of a Muslim couple? Which law will be applicable when co-
habitees (one Muslim and one non-Muslim) live together or have children? 
What will the position be if a Muslim wants to alter his choice after he or she 
has chosen Muslim personal law? Would Muslim personal law be the 
birthright of each Muslim or not? What would happen to Muslims who were 
not born in SA? These are only a few of the issues that need to be addressed 
when a legal system decides on a plurality of legal systems.  
The India experience has also shown that the co-existence of various legal 
systems might lead to so-called "personal law shopping." The following 
scenario may serve as an example: Two Hindus concluded a civil marriage in 
terms of the common law. The husband wants to conclude a second 
marriage, but in terms of the common law polygany is prohibited. However, in 
terms of Muslim personal law, polygany is permitted. What will happen if the 
husband converts to Islam in order to conclude a second Islamic marriage? 
And also, which legal system will apply to the first and which to the second 
marriage?
121  
 
6   Harmonisation of Muslim personal law with the common law 
Another possibility, which could circumvent some of the shortcomings of the 
previous models, is to harmonise Muslim personal law with the common law. 
The harmonisation of the common law with other legal systems is not a new 
idea. The initial aim of the South African Law Reform Commission in their 
                                                 
121  The prevailing circumstances in terms of customary law (the so-called discarded wife) 
also serve as an example of the difficulties that may be experienced if there is more than 
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report on the Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law
122 
was to create "a uniform code of marriage law that would be applicable to all 
South Africans". The idea might be appalling to the adherents of religious 
legal systems.
123 However, the alternative, of which India is a good example, 
is equally atrocious.  
It is argued that the submissions of the United Ulema Council of South Africa 
that a phased approached regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law 
should be followed.
124 It is suggested, therefore, that consideration should be 
given to piecemeal legislation recognising the various branches of Muslim 
personal law in phases. One of the branches that need urgent attention is the 
law of marriage. It is submitted that the current investigation of the South 
African Law Reform Commission should be done in conjunction with the 
existing developments taking place regarding the common law and customary 
law. These developments include: 
(a)  The enactment of the Marriage Act, Extension Act.
125 
(b)  The investigation being done by the South African Law Reform 
Commission on the harmonisation of the common law and the 
indigenous law.
126 
(c) The  enactment  of  the  Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act.
127 
(d)  The investigation being done by the South African Law Reform 
Commission on Islamic marriages.
128 
                                                 
122  SALC Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law 8. 
123    According to Labuschagne 1991 THRHR 846 uniformity will follow when human 
autonomy and deregulation of the marriage is recognised.  
124  The United Ulema Council of South Africa is a body that consists of the major Ulema 
formations of South Africa. Their main objective is to act as a spokesperson for the 
Muslim community on national and international issues. See the submissions of the 
UUCSA contained in annexure C2 to the minutes of the meeting of the SALC 's 
workshop on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters held in Pretoria on 8 March 1997 
(hereinafter referred to as the Minutes of 8 March 1997). 
125  Marriage Act, Extension Act 50 of 1997. The act is retroactive from 27 April 1994 and 
extends the operation of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 to the whole of South Africa. 
126  SALC Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 8 et seq. 
127  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The act came into operation on 15 
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(e)  The investigation being done by the South African Law Reform 
Commission on the Marriage Act.
129  
It is submitted that a secular marriage code that makes provision for a set of 
minimum requirements (dealing with the secular elements of a marriage such 
as age of consent, actual consent, marriage officers and registration of 
marriage) for all in South Africa should be considered. The celebration of the 
marriage could then take place according tot the religious or cultural 
preferences of the parties.
130 Such a step would ensure equality for all South 
Africans before the law, whilst acknowledging cultural and religious 
differences; legal certainty; and the introduction of legislation to ensure that 
women are dealt with on an equal basis and not discriminated against within 
the privacy of a legal system that is excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of 
Rights. 
It is submitted that a previous proposal of the South African Law Reform 
Commission that a "marriage is an institution common to all cultures, all 
marriages no matter what their particular forms would exhibit certain broad 
similarities" is correct. It is therefore logical that a common code of marriage 
law for all South Africans should be developed.
131 In order to give 
intermediate relief to the hardships caused by the non-recognition of Islamic 
marriages, consideration should be given to amending the Marriage Act to 
facilitate the recognition of Islamic marriages.
132 
                                                                                                                                            
128  SALC  Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/ip15.pdf 1 Nov. 
129  South African Law Reform Commission on the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. SALC Review 
of the Marriage Act Discussion Paper 88. 
130  SALC Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 17. 
131  Ibid  8, 17. Although the SALC proposed separate legislation for the recognition of 
customary marriages they did not abandon their initial aim to investigate a single unified 
marriage code. They recognised the fact that their investigation might influence 
investigations into other unrecognised unions, such as Hindu and Islamic marriages, but 
in the light of urgent reform regarding customary marriages, it was decided to go ahead 
with their proposal to have customary marriages recognised. As a result of their 
proposals the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 was enacted. 
132  Whether the same recognition should be afforded to polygamous Islamic marriages is a 
debate that falls outside the scope of this discussion. It is sufficient to point out that it is 
rather a question of polygyny than polygamy, because women are not allowed to marry 
more than one husband. The objections of Western scholars to polygyny are primarily 
based on religious grounds (Bronn v Fritz Bronn's Executors (1860) 3 Searle 313 318-C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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Another issue that needs do be dealt with before recognition is given 
concerns with the obvious conflict between some rights and values contained 
in the Constitution. The Constitution of South Africa prohibits, among other 
things, discrimination on the grounds of sex and gender. On the face of it, 
Muslim law discriminates against females on various grounds. The half-share 
that benefits Muslim men in terms of the law of succession is but one example 
of discrimination against women that needs to be developed.
133  
In response, religious communities argue that the Constitution guarantees the 
practise of religion and culture free from interference. This obvious conflict 
between certain provisions of the  Constitution  has to be resolved before 
Muslim personal law can be recognised. Furthermore, discriminatory rules of 
Muslim personal law have to be reformed before recognition could be given to 
Muslim personal law. There is no doubt that some Muslims would only be 
satisfied with full recognition of their Muslim personal law, and there is little 
doubt that they will be satisfied with anything less. But they should consider 
codifying and reforming their personal law first, and then take something 
concrete to the legislature to consider.
134 
 
                                                                                                                                            
333; Seedat's Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 307-308). In Ryland v Edros 
1997 2 SA 690 (C) 707E it was pointed out that "it is quite inimical to all the values of the 
new South Africa for one group to impose its values on another". There is, however, 
another reason why polygyny should be treated with suspicion, and that concerns the 
issue whether polygyny discriminates against women. The answer to the question 
requires, inter alia, a balancing of competing values and rights such as equality, human 
dignity and religious and culture-based rights. It has already been argued that equality 
should prevail over cultural and religion-based rights. Furthermore, polygyny is one of 
the characteristics of a patriarchal family system (see Sinclair Law of Marriage 167). One 
of the aims of the Promotion and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 is to 
eradicate inequalities caused by patriarchy. It may also be argued that the recognition of 
polygyny between adherents of one legal system discriminates against adherents of 
another legal system, which prohibits polygyny. It is doubtful whether polygyny would 
escape the scrutiny of the Constitution and the Promotion and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
133  These issues are discussed in Rautenbach 2003 QUTLJJ 172-180. But see, Goolam 
2001 Stell LR 199. 
134  Poulter Separate Islamic System 165. C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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7 Conclusion 
A plurality of personal laws in South Africa should be prevented as far as 
possible. The South African system should be developed to accommodate the 
religious and cultural diversity of the country. Up to now many religious 
practices, such as religious marriages, were condemned by the courts and 
legislature due to their potentially polygynous nature. It will be very difficult for 
the government to substantiate why recognition is given to polygynous 
customary marriages whilst polygynous religious marriages are invalid due to 
their potentially polygynous nature. Although, at present, it is mainly the 
Muslim community that demands the recognition of Muslim personal law, the 
possibility that other religious communities in South Africa will soon follow is 
not excluded.  
It is important to recognise and debate the issues regarding the recognition of 
religious legal systems from the onset. In doing so, it is important to reflect on 
the legal and social position of women within these legal systems before any 
legislative recognition is given to personal legal systems that discriminate 
against women.  
The Draft Bill alleviates some of the problems experienced by Muslim couples 
as a result of the non-recognition of their marriages in South Africa. However, 
if the Draft Bill is enacted into legislation and it does not receive universal 
support from the Muslim community in South Africa, it will become mere paper 
law.  C RAUTENBACH  PER 2004(2) 
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